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CRIMINAL LAW SYSTEMATIZED
RICHARD M. HONIG
The author is Professor Emeritus in Goettingen University. He has recently served as Guest Pro-
fessor in the Seminar for Comparative Criminal Law of the New York University Law School. Dr.
Honig has also recently served as Guest Professor in the Institute of Foreign Criminal Law of Freiburg
University.
In this article, the author reviews the second edition of Professor Jerome Hall's book entitled Gen-
eral Principles of Criminal Law. Dr. Honig observes that the attempt made by Hall in this work to
systematize criminal law represents a trend new to the United States but of long standing in European
countries. He further observes that Hall endeavors to base his "principles" upon "many of the ulti-
mate ideas of Western civilization," thereby inviting comparisons between the basic ideas of his sys-
tem and those of the German theory of criminal law. Accordingly, Dr. Honig analyzes and appraises
the principal elements of Hall's system, weighing them critically with the corresponding German
theories.-E rToR.
For many decades European criminal law has
been dominated by theoreticians who, in coopera-
tion with the administration of justice, have en-
deavored to build up systems of the criminal law
of their countries. Most recently a similar trend
is observable in American criminal law. Latest
evidence thereof is Professor Jerome Hall's book
General Principles of Criminal Law.'
I. PROFESSOR HAIL'S ENDEAVOR
As the title indicates, Professor Hall's book is
meant to present a theory and system of criminal
law based on generally valid and generally ap-
plicable principles. Hall has made this perfectly
clear by informing the reader that "the most im-
portant functions of a theory of criminal law are
to elucidate certain basic ideas and organize the
criminal laws... ."2
A. His Continental Referents
This starting point must be borne in mind to
avoid misinterpreting Hall's statement "that the
major shortcoming of the nineteenth century pro-
fessional literature on criminal law, both Anglo-
American and Continental, was the lack of sys-
tem."' 3 To be sure, in the numerous German
systems on criminal law written in the nineteenth
I Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co.; 1960. Pp.
xii, 642. $9.00.
Hereinafter, where page numbers, only, appear in
the footnotes, the reference is to this work.
2 P. 2.
3 Pp. 11-12.
century, by Feuerbach, 4 Abegg,5 K6stlin, s Hd.lsch-
ner,7 Berner,s and Hugo Meyer,9 to mention only
the most influential criminalists, the leading "set
of ideas" is not predominant or dearly enunciated.
But the late nineteenth century systems of crim-
inal law, such as those of von Liszt 0 and Binding,"
are unmistakably composed of basic ideas. The
same holds true of the systems constructed in the
twentieth century by Beling," Max Ernst Mayer,
13
Mezger, 4 von I-Iippel,"5 Sauer, 6 and Wezel." That
4 ANSELM VON FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES GE1MEI-
NEN IN DEUTSCHLAND GULTIGEN PEINLICHEN RECHTS
(14 editions, from the beginning of the 19th century
until 1847).
-1I. FR. H. ABEGG, SYSTEM DER CzNmAL-RxHTcs-
WISSENSCHAT (1826).
6 C. REINHoLD K6STLIN, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN
S RaAREcrTs (1855).
7 
HUGO HXLSCHNER, SYSTEM DES PREUSSISCHEN
STRAFREcHTs, Teil I (1858); DAS GEMEINE DEUTSCHE
STRAERECHT, Bd. I (1881).
8 
ALBERT FRIEDRICH BERNER, LEHRBUcH DES DEUT-
SCHEN STRACxcTs (18th ed. 1898).
9 HUGO MEYER, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAF-
REcHTs (5th ed. 1895).
'0 FRANz VON LISzT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN
STAFREcHrs (25 editions from 1882 until 1927).
1 KARL BINDNG, DIE NOR EN UND I=Ra UEBER-
TRETUNG (1st ed. 1872, 3d ed. 1918).
" ERNsT BELING, DIE LEHmE VOM VERBRECHEN
(1906).
"3MAX ERNST MAYER, DER ALLGEJ EINE TEIL
DES DEUTSCHEN STRAZcHTs (1915).
14 EDMUND MEZGER, STRAFRECaT, EIN LEHRBucH
(3d ed. 1949).
"5ROBERT VON HiPPEL, DEUTScHES STRArREeHT
(Bd. I. 1925, Bd. 1H 1930).
16 WHE=L SAUER, AL.GEMEINE STRAREIcHTs-
r.EmH (3d ed. 1955).
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SYSTEMS (4th ed. 1961).
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Hall does not mention them may be because these
criminalists built their systems on basic ideas and
principles as integrated in the German criminal
law, whereas Hall strives to construct his system
"of a set of ideas by reference to which every penal
law can be... explained."' 8
Hall encourages the reader to compare the basic
ideas of his system with the categories presented
in the German theory of criminal law, when in
the preface to the first edition, reprinted in the
second edition, he points out that his principles
"include many of the ultimate ideas of Western
civilization."10
B. His Interdisciplinary Referents
Hall derives his principles from the union of
rules and doctrines. The significance of the princi-
ples consists in their being "the ultimate norms
of the penal law."20 Each of the three notions-
principles, doctrines, and rules-"serves important
distinctive functions."2' The rules "define particu-
lar crimes and fix the respective punishments and
treatment."2 Doctrines are not to be understood
as theories in the usual meaning of this term, 8 but
are mostly concerned with "unusual or abnormal
states of mind or situations, '24 to wit insanity,
infancy, intoxication, mistake, coercion, necessity,
attempt, conspiracy, solicitation, and complicity.
25
Metaphorically speaking, the doctrines are to be
placed intermediately between the "rules" as the
"narrowest and most numerous" propositions
and the "principles"; being of "the widest gener-
alizations" the latter are at the other extreme of
the line. Their subjects are seven ultimate no-
tions: mens rea, act (effort), the concurrence (fu-
sion) of -mens rea and act, harm, causation, pun-
ishment, and legality.2" To clarify the difference
between principles and doctrines, I may add that
principles relate to elements of the rules that are
part of the definition of the crime in question,
whereas doctrines are concerned with circum-
stances that are to be taken into consideration in
the application of the rules to concrete cases.
However, not all principles are equally important










doctrines are based on juridical logic only. Among
the principles, it is the principles of punishment
and legality which, according to Hall, do not refer
"to essential elements of 'crime'."' The supporting
points of the doctrine of insanity must be sought
in psychiatry and in philosophical perspectives.28
The perpetrator's responsibility may be more or
less influenced by voluntary and involuntary in-
toxication, intoxication psychoses, chronic alco-
holism, and physical injuries. 29 To what extent
the judge should accept the opinions of medical
experts is left to his own determination. As to
kind, degree, and extent of punishment, criminal-
political considerations are of great importance.
Where free determination and considerations of
this kind are involved, the criminalist's opinion
rests on his personal convictions. Therefore, I shall
only briefly refer to Professor Hall's opinions as
far as the above problems are concerned.
Hall's ideas on punishment (chapter 9), mental
disease (chapter 13), intoxication (chapter 14),
and criminology and penal theory (chapter 16)
are instructive and far-seeing. In chapter 9, for
instance, he stresses that the administration of
penal law has to take into consideration retributive
and utilitarian ethics. Hall thus supports the in-
clusive theory," noting with approval that this
theory "has been gaining ground in recent years.""1
He observes that the courts "are attending to the
gravity of the harm, the personality of the offender,
the public interest, the available peno-correctional
facilities, and so on.""2 However, as Hall stresses,
to strengthen this sound trend the inter-depend-
ence of penal theory and criminology has to be
recognized"l "the various disciplines concerned
with criminal conduct, law and punishment should
"'34be viewed as a single inquiry ....
Likewise, psychiatry, law, and legal science
should find a common basis.2 5 The leading example
of this need is to be found in the problem of re-
sponsibility. According to Hall it is the M'Naghten
Rule which provides guidance to the jury, al-
though its reform seems to him absolutely neces-
sary. The wording of the Rule, as used today, does
not take into account "the integration of all the
27 p. 18.
28 Pp. 454-55.
-2 Pp. 533, 554.








principal functions of personality." 36 The rational
function, to which alone the Rule refers, must be
joined by the volitional function. 7 Thus, the jury
should be asked "(1) whether, because of mental
disease, the defendant lacked the capacity to
understand the nature and consequences of his
conduct; and (2) whether, because of such disease,
the defendant lacked the capacity to realize that
it was morally wrong to commit the harm in ques-
tion."3 If instead of the restrictive word "know"
the wider terms "understand" and "realize" are
used, the Rule takes "full account of the volitional
function of personality."39
In the chapter on "Intoxication," Hall severely
censures the courts' hostility toward the drunken
offender, as seen particularly in their readiness to
imply voluntary drunkenness. 40 Hall finds further
fault with the courts for their frequent failure to
take seriously the defense of fraud and coercion
in becoming drunk,4M and for their tendency not
to recognize temporary insanity produced by
drunkenness as destroying responsibility.4 Es-
pecially noteworthy is Hall's suggestion that differ-
ent legal consequences should apply as between
drunken offenders without prior experience with
the influence of alcohol upon them, and those
whose previous experience should have forewarned
them. 43
II. THE PRwnciPxES
Turning now to Hall's principles as based solely
on juridical logic, I must regretfully confess that I
differ from Hall's interpretation of all the main
problems essential to any system of criminal law.
A. Legality and the Essential Elements of Crime
As mentioned above, the principles of punish-
ment and legality are, according to Hall, unrelated
to the essential elements of the crime.4' That
punishment is not related to such elements is evi-
dent. As a reaction against a violation of pro-
hibitory or imperious legal norms, punishment
should correspond to the gravity of the violation;4"











of punishment to the essential elements of the
crime. The situation, however, is different with
regard to the principle of legality. Hall notes
aptly that one meaning of this principle is "that
no conduct may be held criminal unless it is pre-
cisely described in a penal law."'4' In other words,
this principle demands that in order to be punish-
able, conduct must correspond to the elements of
the definition of the crime in question. Hall ex-
presses this idea by saying: "[Wihen a legal writer
speaks only of harm, conduct, punishment and
so on,... what he probably means to say is legally
proscribed conduct, legally proscribed harm,
legally prescribed punishment, and so on."4 7 Thus,
it is precisely the conformity of the elements of
the conduct to the elements of the crime as defined
by law that underlies the significance of the prin-
ciple of legality. Consequently, it is not conceivable
to me why, despite the demand of such conformity,
which in the German doctrine is called "Tatbe-
standsmdssigkeit," the principle of legality has no
relation to the essential elements of crime.
B. Conc-urrence
Hall puts the relation between imes rea and
conduct under the principle of concurrence, i.e.,
the fusion or integration of viens rea and act."3
That mens rea has to coalesce with conduct has,
as Hall notices, contributed to the development
of criminal law. For instance, larceny by bailee
and embezzlement became recognized as special
crimes against property because the perpetrator
made up his mind to appropriate property of
another person only when he was already in pos-
session of it.
But there are border cases, particularly Jackson
v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 239, 38 S.W. 422 (1896),
on which Hall's discussion leaves me dissatisfied.
In the Jackson case, the defendant, a medical
student, had given his pregnant girl friend a large
dose of cocain with the intent to kill her, and then,
under the mistaken belief that she was dead, he
had severed her head from her body. This decapi-
tation, only, caused her death. Hall views the
defendant's conviction of murder as a miscarriage
of justice; he regards the decision as a violation
of the principle of concurrence. "[T]he mens rea,"
he states, "did not concur with the actual killing."





being at the time of the decapitation.149 This
certainly is true. But is "concurrence" only meas-
urable by the dock? Should not the "fusion" or
"integration" of inens rea and act be regarded
under the viewpoint that the act was done with
the intention to produce the harm in question?
German jurisprudence attains satisfactory results
by making use of the concept "doluts generalis,"
taking primarily into consideration the essential
and immoral quality of the conduct. This, indeed,
is, if I understand Hall correctly, the requirement
implied in the principle of concurrence.50 Then,
however, not the question of time but the substance
of the perpetrator's guilt, his intention concomitant
with his conduct or his indifference to the risk
involved, is decisive.
It seems to me that Hall interprets the principle
of concurrence in this way in cases of culpable
forbearance. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed.
592 (S.D.N.Y. 1904), involved a shipwreck in
which many passengers were drowned due to the
defectiveness of the lifebelts. The captain and
the owners of the boat were found guilty of man-
slaughter. "The nature of the offense," said the
court, "precluded a single act." The duty of the
captain and the owners to take care for the safety
of the passengers "was continuing." Thus the
court found the forbearance of the culprits to be a
continuing crime. Hall, however, is of the opinion
that "there is no need to resort to a fiction of 'con-
tinuing' forbearance in order to satisfy the prin-
ciple of concurrence.... If an offender inten-
tionally or recklessly creates a dangerous situation
which later causes a proscribed harm, liability
attaches to his conduct, i.e., to the 'concurrence'
of the nens rea and the manifested effort ('act'),
not to that of the mens rea and the harm."' 1 I
don't see why this should hold true only where a
dangerous situation is created. When the perpetra-
tor aims at injuring or killing another person and
obtains his purpose by a turn of the causality he
had not foreseen, as in the Jackson case, he like-
wise should be fully responsible for the harm.
Besides, I do not think the court took "resort to a
fiction of 'continuing' forbearance in order to sat-
isfy the principle of concurrence." Rather, the
case in question involved a continuing crime. Since
those responsible for the welfare of the passengers
acted recklessly, they knew, according to the mean-




court was entitled even to impute this knowledge
if, as Hall points out, "a reasonable man in the
given situation would have been aware of it." 52
A reasonable man, however, would have been
aware of it not merely before or at the embarka-
tion, but also during the voyage. The inens rea
of the people responsible extended over the dura-
tion of their duty to care for their passengers. This
does in fact correspond to the opinion of the Eng-
lish and American as well as the German crim-
inalists. Hall's stigmatization of the court's view
as "fiction" seems to me consistent with his re-
fusal to recognize the dogma that an omission
is punishable only in case there was a legal duty
to take action. We shall return to this problem
under heading D.
C. Harm
The preceding argument leads to the clarifica-
tion of the term "harm," one of the seven "ultimate
notions. ' ' 3 If we understand harm to be "a central
notion of penal theory,"-" it should follow that it
consists of endangering or violating one of those
ultimate values the protection of which is the aim
of criminal law. This obviously is its meaning when
Hall defines it as "loss of a value," and when it is
"stated in terms of intangibles such as 'harm' to
institutions, public safety, the autonomy of
women, and so on." 55 However, Hall does not re-
strict the notion "harm" to intangibles, but ap-
plies it to physical injuries as well. When he speaks
of "harm" as "the end sought" or "the focal point
between criminal conduct.., and the punitive
sanction""6 he seems to have the physical object
of the perpetrator's action in view. The importance
of harm in this sense is underscored by the state-
ment that "harm... is the fulcrum between
criminal conduct and the punitive sanction" and
that the elucidation of this relation "is a principal
task of penal theory."
This ambiguity, which has existed in American
criminal law for a long time, is disadvantageous
to the systematization of the criminal law. It re-
sults from a general neglect to recognize a differ-
ence between crimes resulting in factual injuries
to other persons and crimes consisting merely of









difference leads to the distinction between
Erfolgsdelikte, crimes causing factual effects, and
scldichte Tdtigkeitsdelikte, crimes committed and
consummated without such effects. If Hall had
recognized that these two groups of crimes are of
equal significance for the goal of any criminal law,
he would have seen that American criminalists do
not "list exceptions" and add "confusion" when
they state "that in some crimes there are harms,
but in other crimes there is only conduct."-"
D. Act (Effort)
Punishment is justified only when harm, under-
stood either as "end sought" or as "loss of value,"
is caused by criminal conduct. Professor Hall
starts his chapter on "Criminal Conduct" by re-
porting briefly on Austin's definition of conduct:
"Act is a voluntary movement. It consists of
muscular motions which immediately follow the
wish for that movement.""9 Hall contrasts this
strict concept with the very wide definition of
Salmond: "'[A]ct' includes (1) the offender's
bodily movements or omissions and (2) the ac-
companying circumstances and (3) the conse-
quences."6 If we ask which of these contrasting
concepts is to be preferred, we must take into con-
sideration that intention and volition are, accord-
ing to Austin, "inseparably connected," whereas,
according to Salmond, "intention is not a necessary
condition of legal liability.... 61 To agree with
Salmond means, as Hall stresses, "to include
negligent, i.e., inadvertent, behavior" in the notion
"act. 16 2 This, however, is, as I will show later,
contrary to Hall's concept of criminal conduct.
Furthermore, since the term "act" is ambiguous,
as it covers not only overt bodily movements, but
also doing nothing, Hall prefers the term "effort,"
which refers to "both voluntary movement and
[voluntary] forbearance."" "[I]n criminal for-
bearance the offender 'uses' active external forces
by not interfering with certain effects of their
operation."' 4 In relation to the realization of the
effort, Hall distinguishes between the "internal
effort of intention" and the "manifested effort
which actualizes the mens rea in the external









voluntary overt movement and... voluntary
forbearance, may be termed an 'act'." 6
Since the manifested (or further) effort is the
materialization of mets rea, which comprehends
both "relevant cognition, i.e. knowledge of the
material facts, and an internal effort, 'movement
of the will,' "17 and since every effort is "positive
and operative,"' any omission, "in a sense other
than voluntary forbearance," is, according to
Hall, "fictitious."69 Consequently, Hall concludes,
negligence, in the sense of inadvertence, is not
included in the notion "conduct." There Temains,
however, I submit, the question whether this is
sound penal theory. To be sure, in cases of negli-
gence the perpetrator does not aim at something
unlawful. His intention is not directed to the in-
jury caused by his negligence. However, his failure
to consider the possibility that he might injure
someone indicates that he is wanting in that degree
of attention which the law expects and demands
of everyone. His conduct does not correspond to
that carefulness and consideration which everyone
owes to his fellow-citizens20 This fact justifies
punishment in case negligence causes harm.
As to the punishment of omissions, Hall refers
to English decisions of the early nineteenth cen-
tury. Under these decisions, an omission was
punished if, according to the circumstances, "a
legal duty to act was definitely recognized."' For
the second half of the nineteenth century, Hall
mentions Macaulay and Stephen who pointed out
the rules regarding punishable omissions. Both
stressed that the omission of "benevolent moral-
ity" is not sufficient to justify punishment. They
felt there must be a relationship between the omis-
sion and the positive law in order to stigmatize
the omission as a violation of a legal duty to act2
This train of thought corresponds to the defini-
tion of punishable omissions to be found in the
Comments of the German Draft of a Criminal Code
of 1960. The Comments dearly state that the
moral duty to prevent a danger or injury does not
create a legal duty to act. Rather, such duty must
be established by the law itself before the inactive
person may be held responsible for not preventing





70 Cf. WELzEL, op. cit. supra note 17, at 35 et seq.
71 P. 192.
7P. 193.
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expressed in the Comments represents 100 years
of learned deliberations on the problem of crimes
causing harms and committed by omissions
(Unechte Unterlassungsdelikte). In codified form it
is contained in §13 of the authorized German
Draft mentioned above.
Hall, however, is of the opinion that "it requires
only brief scrutiny... to disclose the superficiality
of that theory." "The assertion that an omission
is criminal if there is a legal duty to act ... is a
mere tautology if 'legal duty' means a duty im-
posed by criminal law."74 This is certainly true,
since if omissions are prohibited by criminal law
it is implied that the criminal law itself demands
certain actions. But the English decisions cited
by Hall 75 dealt with harms occasioned by violation
of duties to act imposed not by the criminal law,
but by private law-such as the duty to provide
sufficient food to children, to an apprentice, or to
a servant. Harms of this kind would not have oc-
curred if the persons who had a legal duty to act
had fulfilled their duties. This is the reason why a
person who, by remaining inactive, violates such
duty is responsible for the harm caused by his
inactivity.
In response to arguments like this one, Hall
maintains that the above theory proves to be
fallacious, no matter whether "it is intended to
mean that whenever a civil law requires the doing
of an overt act, failure to do it is criminal," or "to
mean that an omission is not criminal unless a legal
duty is also imposed by civil law. ' 76 He notes that
"failure to file a tax return, to keep a road in re-
pair, and to perform official duties are common
instances of the lack of any relevant private legal
duty."7
Nobody should question this, since these ex-
amples, like others added to them, concern plain
omissions (echte Unterlassungsdelikte), appertaining
to the realm of public law. Thus, Hall may cor-
rectly assert that these cases are "unrelated to
private law." But as plain omissions these cases
do not cause tangible harms proscribed by criminal
law. They do not prove anything against the
dogma that inactivity is punishable when a person
by private or public law was obliged to prevent the
harm.
I agree without reservation with Hall's state-





private law to the criminal law is sometimes one
of reference by the latter to the former, in the
sense that it is forbidden to omit doing certain
acts which are defined in the private law." 8 I can-
not see, however, why Hall states: "This does not
imply that the penal law is enforcing private law,
but only that the latter proscriptions are also
penal laws." 9 Hall substitutes here proscriptions
of the private law for its precepts. Only the latter
are in question. The omission of precepts prompts
criminal prosecution if a person by not acting ac-
cording to them causes tangible harm that is
punishable.
In sum, I don't think that Hall has succeeded
in shaking the doctrine that punishment of an
omission that caused tangible harm is conditioned
by the violation of a legal duty to act. For this
reason, I consider Hall's statement untenable
"that, so far as the principle of legality is con-
cerned, there is nothing distinctive about criminal
omissions." 80
Having come to this conclusion, Hall asks: "Can
criminal omissions be distinguished from overt
criminal conduct by reference to some other sig-
nificant criterion, e.g., as regards causation?" 8' If a
father stands by while his child drowns, he is
liable, "whereas the stranger is not liable although
the physical facts and the chain of physical causa-
tion are identical in both cases. This indicates
that physical causation, alone, does not determine
liability. There must also be something else; and
in criminal omissions that element is illegal in-
action, one might say, wrongly allowing the forces
of physical causation to operate when one, bound
by law, could have altered certain of their con-
sequences, i.e. precisely the human factor."8
It seems to me that the problem of causation
finally opened the door for the admission of the
legal duty to act. For, what else could be implied
by "bound by law" to alter the consequences?
Or do the words: "precisely the human factor"
contain a reservation or restriction?
In the section "Policy of Criminal Omissions"
Hall speaks of the "particular duty" of parents
to their children, of the "special obligation" of a
railroad employee, of a "particular obligation" of
one who agrees to look after an aged person. It is










such duty or obligation, since from the viewpoint
of morality the bystander is no less obliged to save
the child than the father. "The essential difference,
it is suggested, inheres not in moral obligation, but
in mores, in the public attitudes regarding the
respective parties .... 3
In opposition to this concept, I am of the opinion
that it is not the mores, i.e., the public opinion, but
the law in its entirety which creates particular
duties or special obligations on the basis either of
private or public relationship. If harm, forbidden
by criminal law, is the consequence of a failure to
perform a duty or obligation, then the failure is
punishable as a crime because the law-not the
mores-demands action.
E. Causation
In cases of omissions, it is not physical causation
as such, as Hall points out, but inaction allowing
the forces of physical causation to operate which
determines liability. Thus, in law the term cau-
sality "has a teleological significance that dis-
tinguishes it from mechanical causation."' 4 This
necessarily leads to the question of the nature or
essence of the "cause-in-law" or "legal cause."
After displaying various meanings of the term
"cause," 85 Hall analyzes in his chapter on "Causa-
tion" the three aspects under which a legal cause
is to be comprehended: (1) Conduct must be the
coanditio sine qua wi the harm in issue would not
have occurred; (2) the condition must have "effec-
tively, i.e. substantially" contributed to the harm;
(3) finally, to be a legal cause, the necessary and
substantial condition must be the expression of
"a relevant imns rea, i.e., necessary, efficient end-
seeking."86 "In sum," says Hall, "a cause-in-law
means a cause which is not only a necessary, sub-
stantial factor, but also one that includes certain
conduct which expresses a required mzens rea."
''
At the beginning of his book Hall points at the
dependence of the notion "legal cause" on the
conception of mens rea: For the definition of mens
rea to include inadvertence or negligent behavior
"not only clouds the meaning of ines rea and
penal harm, it also greatly obscures the causal
problem in penal law."' ' 3 Even more distinct is the







in the introduction to the chapter on "Causation":
".... inens rea and the defendant's external move-
ments are required... the conduct, thus formed,
is the cause of penal harm."8 9
These statements raise the question: Is the char-
acterization of the conduct as "manifestation of
the inens rea" necessary to explain the production
of criminal harm or only its punishability?
Hall seems to be well aware that to consider
inens rea as an element of the legal cause contra-
dicts the generally demanded separation of causa-
tion from guilt: "The temptation to exclude mnens
rea from problems of causation arises from over-
concentration on mechanical causation, resulting
from a failure to appreciate the distinctive meaning
of the principle of causation in penal law."9 As
the fundamental of penal law the principle of
inens rea is, according to Hall, influential "in deter-
mining the meaning of 'cause' in the teleological
sense."191
The stress Hall lays upon the term "cause in
the teleological sense" and its relation to inens rea
induces me to find behind Hall's conception a
fundamental thought I tried to develop some time
ago.Y2 I believe that in order to comprehend the
legal relationship between conduct and harm it is
not enough to recognize human conduct as a
co-nditio sine qua ion relative to the harm in issue.
This fact is recognized by the so-called selective
theories, the best known of which is the Adequance
Theory. According to it, conduct is a cause-in-law
if it usually creates the harm in issue. However,
Sauer has pointed out93 that by judging the con-
duct according to its fitness to create the harm in
issue we are no longer occupied with causality as
such, but with a totally different, teleological and
normative problem. For, while the subject of
causality is the ontological relationship of the
conduct to harm, any selection among the con-
ditions that come into question as causes of the
harm is based on a judgment as to their general
fitness to produce such harm. By entering this
axiological question we leave behind the realm of
ontological contemplations.
Needless to say that nothing else but human
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produce harm is in question, and that conduct must
be a manifestation of the human will in order to
create legal consequences. The question whether
the conduct was generally qualified to create the
harm in issue leads to the alternative whether a
certain conduct in relation to its result, to wit the
harm in issue, can or cannot, from an objective
point of view, be considered as "end-directed,"
i.e., as "zweckhaft gesetzt." In sum, only if an in-
dependent axiological judgment follows the onto-
logical sine-qua-nwn-judgment are we able to judge
whether the defendant's conduct was the cause-
in-law of the harm in question and, if the answer
is in the affirmative, to proceed to the question
of his inens rea.
With regard to my refusal to connect the ques-
tion of causality with the defendant's mens rea, I
feel considerably supported by Professor G. 0.
W. Mueller's criticism of Hall's theory as discussed
in Mueller's "An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's Stud-
ies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory. ' 94 In
these Studies, published in 1958, Hall introduced
the defendant's nwies rea as a third element of the
cause-in-law. Mueller objected by pointing out that
"meCns rea... is too far removed from causation
to be part thereof by construction." Rather, it is
the "foreseeability" which "is properly subsumable
under the primary principle of conduct." "There-
fore, prediction or foreseeability becomes properly
the third limitation on the causation inquiry.
But causation, even in this sense... ,does not
suffice for the imposition of guilt or blame."
Professor Mueller's and my conceptions of the
cause-in-law differ in the final analysis only in so
far as Mueller stresses the foreseeability of the
consequences, whereas I suggest that the objective
suitability of the conduct to produce the harm in
issue is the ultimate criterion of the relevancy of
the conduct, if other conditions beside the conduct
as such contributed to produce the harm. I should
presume that Hall would not have taken pains to
prove mens rea to be the third element of the cause-
in-law if he had not taken as self-explanatory but
had scrutinized the conditions under which the
predicate "substantial cause" 95 can be attributed
to one of several causes or the predicate "efficiency
or adequacy" to a necessary cause. 6 Predicates
as these are objective standards based on common
opinion and experience, just as foreseeability of the
consequences or the objective suitability of the
9434 IND. L.J. 206 (1959).
"P. 283.
96 P. 292.
conduct. By these standards the legal significance
of the conduct as such is determined. Whether the
defendant could be expected to .act in conformity
with them is a different question. This is the ques-
tion of guilt.
F. Mei-s Rea, Negligence and Recklessness
Criminal guilt is established when man's con-
duct is the actualization of his mens rea, i.e., of
that state of mind which includes "knowing or
believing, with reference to the material facts and,
also, the internal effort of intention." The im-
mediate and inevitable logical consequence of this
definition offered by Hal' is the exclusion of
negligence from guilt. For "negligence implies
inadvertence, i.e., that the defendant was com-
pletely unaware of the dangerousness of his be-
havior."" "Between the extremes of intentionality
and negligence lies recklessness." 9 Thus, inten-
tionality, recklessness, and negligence are the
three basic mental positions relative to the de-
fendant's criminal liability for his conduct.
In the case of intentionality, the perpetrator
intentionally commits a morally wrong act;"' he
has chosen to cause a proscribed harm by his
conduct.1 0' The reckless person, on the other hand,
does not intend to cause harm. However, he does
not mind increasing "the existing chances that a
proscribed harm will occur"1i2 In this sense,
"recklessness connotates awareness.' ' i Professor
Hall realizes perfectly well that the limitation of
the notion "recklessness" is not in line with the
definition of recklessness as given in §500 A.L.I.
Restatement, Torts. He is of the opinion that it "is
plainly opposed to the meaning of recklessness"
that someone who "was not aware of the fact that
he was unduly increasing the risk of harm,... was
nonetheless reckless if the 'reasonable man' would
have known the risk." By the definition of the
above §500, persons are held reckless, even though
they were only negligent.9 4 It is true, says Hall,
that "recklessness resembles negligence in that
both include an unreasonable increase in the risk
of harm; both fall below the standard of 'due












state of awareness" which intention and reckless-
ness have in common, and which is missing in the
case of negligence. "[U]nless it is determined that
the defendant knew he was increasing the risk of
harm, it cannot be defensibly held that he acted
recklessly."' 0
This determination, however, apparently can be
compensated by the supposition that the defendant
knew he was increasing the risk of harm: "[T]o
find a defendant reckless," Hall maintains, "the
jury needs to be informed that.., they must find
that his conduct fell below the standard of 'due
care' and that the defendant knew he was increas-
ing the risk of harm; and that they are warranted
in so finding if they find that a reasonable man in
the given situation would have been aware of
it.,,107
The bearing of this rule of procedure on the sub-
stantive law was dearly expressed in Coynnwn-
wealth v. Welansky: "Knowledge of facts on ac-
count of which a reasonable man would have seen
the risk, is equivalent to the knowledge of the risk
itself."' 03 In other words, the awareness, the in-
dispensable element of the recklessness, need be
related only to the material facts. If this awareness
is established, the rule of procedure, as displayed
by Hall, permits the supposition that the de-
fendant knew he was endangering other people by
his conduct. This supposition depends, to be sure,
on the further assumption that a reasonable man
would have seen the risk in the given circum-
stances.
However, if this does satisfy the requisite of the
"awareness of increasing the danger," then the
question arises as to what the liability of the de-
fendant is based upon if he did in fact not know
that he by his conduct endangered other people.
If the defendant knew he endangered other people,
his liability rests on the fact that he acted never-
theless. If, however, he was conscious only of the
facts increasing the risk, not of the risk itself, he
is liable because he should have been conscious of
increasing the risk if a reasonable man would have
been aware of it.
The contrast between a person who disregards
the risk he has taken and a person who was capable
of thinking of the risk, but was in fact not aware
of it, corresponds to the distinction made in Ger-
man criminal law between perpetrators who acted
with conscious negligence and those who were not
105 P. 120.
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conscious of their negligence: bewusse und unbe-
wusste Fahrliissigkeit. This distinction underlies
the definitions of "recklessly" and "negligently"
in §2.02 (2) (c) and (d) respectively of the Model
Penal Code. As we remember, Hall excludes negli-
gence from the mens rea, since inens rea requires
awareness, and it is "awareness of increasing the
danger" which separates recklessness "completely
from the genus of negligence.""' Such awareness
is, as Hall admits, presumable and imputable in
cases of reckless conduct. I submit that awareness
becomes fictitious if it can be presumed and im-
puted to the defendant, subject to the application
of the reasonable-man standard. I don't see any
reason why the same imputation should not be
available in cases of negligence if a reasonable man
under the given circumstances would not have
acted as did the negligent defendant. For "a person
acts negligently.., when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk.""10 Thus, Hall's
standpoint that recklessness creates criminal
liability, even if awareness of increasing the danger
was not determinable, while negligence, on the
other hand, does not, is in my opinion untenable
from the viewpoint of juridico-logical deduction.
To support his position, Professor Hall en-
deavors to prove that even the "traditional ethical
ground-the insensitivity of these harm-doers to
the rights of other persons"m-is not strong
enough to justify punishment of negligent harm-
doers. We may restrict ourselves to the discussion
of only the most important arguments.
Hall does not believe that punishment "will
sensitize thoughtless individuals to the rights of
other persons." "[T]he legal apparatus cannot
assure such a dose association between negligence
and pain as to provide any support for the use of
punishment on this ground."'m But it is obvious
that this argument could also be used against
punishing crimes intentionally committed.
Furthermore, Hall points out that there is no
evidence that punishment or the threat of it may
deter negligent harm-doers."3 However, it is not
so much deterrence but correction that is aimed
at in the punishment of negligent persons. More-
over, punishment for negligent harm-doers should,
according to Hall, be greater than usually provided,
since "the cause of negligence may be so deeply
09 P. 128.






rooted in the personality structure of the inad-
vertent harm-doer as to require a great deal of
punishment to alter his habits. 114 Since in this
connection Hall reproaches the legislators of Con-
tinental criminal codes for employing an "incon-
gruous makeshift" it must be remembered that a
crime committed by negligence is generally con-
sidered to be deserving of milder punishment than
a crime done intentionally, because a man causing
harm intentionally to other people a priori ap-
pears more guilty than a man acting negligently.
Finally, if inadvertence is rooted in the person-
ality structure, the attitudes of a person insensitive
with regard to creating danger are, according to
Hall, not matters of his choice; "hence there is no
warrant for punishing him on... traditional moral
ground."' ' I should reply that everyone responsi-
ble for his conduct is obliged to watch and educate
himself and, for this reason, he is liable for his
laisser faire, laisser aller.
G. Mens Rea and Strict Liability
In chapter 10 Hall deals with the problem of
strict liability, i.e., "liability to punitive sanctions
despite the lack of nmens rea."16 Since criminal law
is based on moral culpability "strict liability can-
not be brought within the scope of penal law."" 7
Thus, a "careful analysis of the established law of
strict penal liability" appears justified."'
Since there are numerous public welfare offenses
proscribed without any allusion to mens rea, mens
rea, it is concluded, is not made a necessary basis
of punishing them. Hall espeoially calls our atten-
tion to those proscriptions against "knowingly" or
"wilfully" doing certain acts, where then "follows
a provision omitting the above terms, and usually
fixing a lesser penalty."'19 "It is this sort of pro-
vision," Hall adds, "that usually comprises strict
liability." Does this form of provision necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the legislators estab-
lished strict liability, or did they perhaps think of
negligent behavior?
Hall himself calls forth this question by quoting
the decision Reg. v. Woodrow (1846), in which the
court said: The defendant (a tobacco dealer)
was "bound to take care .... In reality, a prudent







to guard against the injury he complains of .... ,,2
Thus, one is permitted to conclude, Woodrow
was punished because he did not take that care a
prudent man would have taken in conducting his
business.
Similar deliberations hold true for early Ameri-
can decisions. Hall refers especially to Common-
wealth v. Farren (1864), in which the court em-
phasized among other viewpoints the importance
of protecting the community against the common
adulteration of food and the reasonableness of
imposing the risk upon the dealer and thus hold-
ing him "absolutely liable."' Later on, Hall
remarks very pertinently that many of the public
welfare regulations "suppose a continuous ac-
tivity, such as carrying on a business. This im-
plies that general standards regarding such con-
duct are important rather than isolated acts."'
Nevertheless, these public welfare regulations
"do not," according to Hall, "provide any justi-
fication of penal liability at the present time."'m
In opposition to this conclusion, I would submit
the question: Is it not just these general standards
upon which the decision depends as to whether
the defendant is liable? To reproach someone with
negligent conduct means that he is blamed for
not having observed that care which a prudent
man is expected to observe. It is the difference
between the defendant's conduct and the conduct
of a prudent man upon which the reproach is
based. More specifically: With regard to negligent
conduct-the usual form of public welfare of-
fenses-the defendant is blamed because he did
not realize that by his conduct he violated certain
regulations. Hall himself admits "that, despite
the avowals of strict liability, intent and negli-
gence actually play some essential part in such
offenses."' 2  "[T]herefore," he continues, "it
may be urged... that they are designed to catch
the willful and the negligent; they are not intended
to penalize those who are faultless. But the statutes
are so phrased as to include the innocent, and
these are caught occasionally as a result of in-
competent administration."'
25
It seems to me most regrettable that Hall deems
these arguments untenable, although, later on,









the modern law of strict liability, many judges
have suggested that the defendants were negligent
and that, had they used due care, the violation
would not have occurred.'
126
Deliberations like these lead, in my opinion, to
the assumption that the judges would not have
found the defendants guilty if their conduct had
not evidenced their negligence. Consequently,
decisions in which defendants were sentenced
without any evidence of their negligence should
be frankly acknowledged as erroneous.
Perkins has remarked that "the so-called 'strict
liability' means much more strict than usual, but
it does not mean that the doing of the prohibited
act requires conviction under any and all cir-
cumstances." '' - Obviously, much stricter than
usual is a defendant's liability when with regard
to his profession or special licenses he is expected
to observe special care in his dealings with other
people or in possibly endangering them by his
conduct. The standard of his negligence is not the
conduct of a prudent man in general, but the
conduct of a conscientious man of his profession
or licensed activities.
III. TEE Docrm~ms
Passing on to Hall's doctrines, we must re-
member that they are not to be understood as
theories in the usual meaning of this term, but
as "propositions more general than the rules but
lacking the extensiveness of the principles."'m
Their function is to complete the specific crimes.
"[Only after the doctrines have been added to
the rules has the penal law, i.e., the definitions of
all the specific crimes, been fully stated."19 Thus,
"a complete definition of specific crimes must
always include the doctrines."'130 However, "the
rules provide definitions of the 'normal' criminal
conduct of 'normal' persons committing specified
harms in 'normal' situations."'' The doctrines,
on the other hand, are mostly concerned with
"unusual or abnormal states of mind or
situations."' Therefore, "the terms of the rules
are to be given the meaning required by the doc-
trines in their affirmative significance."' In other
words, since "the rules do not completely define
1" P. 357.







the specific crimes," their meaning "must be
determined by incorporation of the relevant doc-
trines in their affirmative significance.""
4
The starting point of Hall's train of thought, to
wit: most of the doctrines concern unusual or
abnormal situations, has its parallel in the German
doctrine of the "negative Tatumstiinde," i.e.,
negative material circumstances, such as self-
defense, legitimate commands, consent, and so
on. The legal effect of these circumstances is that
the action is not illegal, and therefore no crime
is committed. The effects of Hall's doctrines, in
contrast, are most heterogeneous: Insanity and
infancy absolutely exclude criminal capacity;
intoxication and mistake may exclude responsi-
bility; coercion and necessity exclude free will, a
basic element of nens tea; attempt and complicity
are modalities of committing crimes; solicitation
and conspiracy are delicta sui generis. These
structural and functional differences of the sub-
jects of the doctrines, on the one hand, and Hall's
proposition, on the other hand, repeated time and
again, though phrased differently, "that law is
fully stated when the doctrines are added to the
rules," provokes the following question: How is
the unexceptive requirement of the "incorpora-
tion of the relevant doctrines in their affirmative
significance" to the rules to be carried out when
their effects on the meins rea are not as obvious as
in the cases of insanity or infancy?
A. Complicity, Solicitation and Conspiracy
Complicity is by reason of its nature of affirma-
tive significance. Added to a specific crime it
marks this crime as an exception from the rules
which by imputing the act to one person only
"provide definitions of the 'normal' criminal
conduct.., in 'normal' situations." Thus, by
incorporation of complicity, not "normality" of
the situation is determined, but just contrariwise
an abnormality.
In the administration of justice as well as in
textbooks solicitation and conspiracy are justly
conceived to be delicta sui generis. Nevertheless, a
negative significance of these terms may be recog-
nized in relation to the crimes solicited or con-
spired befbre these crimes are committed. It is in
their commissions in which the affirmative sig-
nificance of solicitation or conspiracy may be
found. However, when the solicited or conspired




(as in former days) considered to be merged in it
but is punished independently of it, while solicita-
tion takes on the meaning of aiding and abetting,
and the solicitor is punished as principal. Thus,
there is no incorporation of solicitation or con-
spiracy in the crime committed. They only may
be useful as evidence. Hall does not explain how
the doctrines of complicity and solicitation and
conspiracy are to be incorporated "in order that
complete definitions of crimes be provided."
B. Criminal Attempt
Likewise I could not find any indication for
completing the definitions of specific crimes with
regard to the doctrine of criminal attempt. Hall
defines the aim of this doctrine in the section on
"Rules and Doctrine" in chapter 15. It "empha-
sizes the common features of all the harms de-
scribed in the rules defining specific criminal
attempts.' 1 35 These specific attempts are, if I
understand Hall correctly, consummated crimes.
Consequently, there is no reason for making use of
the doctrine of criminal attempt so that the defi-
nitions of these crimes be "fully stated." But
"these descriptions are particular instances of
the doctrine." ' 6 This presumably means that the
doctrine is to be applied to all attempts adjudi-
cated in accordance with a general definition of
attempt, as for instance that given in article 1,
section 2 of the Penal Law of the State of New
York. If in these cases the doctrine of criminal
attempt is applied in its "affirmative significance,"
i.e., not indicating an abnormal situation, the
consummated crime would be put in the place of
the crime attempted. But it is the consummated
crimes which, save the exceptions of the "specific
attempts" mentioned above, are described by
the rules. Therefore I cannot conceive what the
doctrine of criminal attempt in its affirmative
significance might contribute to the complete
description of the crimes in question.
In the section on "Preparation and Attempt"
in chapter 15, Hall reviews the difference between
preparation and attempt. He reminds the reader
of the efforts to define the attempt by descriptive
terms such as "moving directly toward the com-
mission of the offense," "the commencement of
consummation," "direct movement, tending
immediately," "proximately," and so on."' 3'




as "a mere formality."1 3 This is understandable
in view of their variety. However, the criterion
"commencement of consummation" means the
same as the formulae "comnencement d'exncution"
in the French penal code and "Anfang der
Ausfiihrung" in the German penal code, both
terms implying the beginning of the punishable
action. This criterion serves as a very usable
yardstick, since it covers any action which due
to its natural coherence with the specific crime
appears to be part of it. Hall prefers the criterion
of the "proximateness" of the harm done to the
intended ultimate harm. 9 Hereby he shifts the
center of gravity of the problem from the act as
such to its effect. However, not only the attempt
but also the preparation of the crime endangers
social interests and is in so far harmful. Since under
this viewpoint there is, as Hall admits, "no es-
sential difference between states of preparation
and criminal attempts,"'4 0 the boundary between
preparation and attempt would depend solely
upon the question of the degree of danger brought
about by the preparation. For determining this
degree there is no other gauge but the free estimate
of the judge.
With regard to the so-called impossibility of an
attempt, Hall dismisses the distinction between
factual and legal impossibility, as to which differ-
ent legal consequences were generally recognized
in American adjudication until Faustina v. State
of California, 345 P.2d 543 (1959). Hall rejects
this distinction as untenable, since the "view of
'legal impossibility' has no greater validity than
the earlier theory of 'absolute impossibility'."'
4'
He prefers as the criterion the "apparent objective
risk of harm."'' But the probability of success
must have appeared high.'4 ' "This suggests that
the reasonableness of the effort provides a limita-
tion."' 4' In other words: The principle of legality
is observed and punishment is justified if the
perpetrator reasonably deems those external facts
existent which would lead to the desired effect if
they were in fact existent. Decisive is therefore
the nens rea of the perpetrator manifested by his
conduct which would have caused the effect if the
circumstances had been congruous to those he










This standpoint corresponds to the so-called
"subjektive Theorie" of the former German
Reiclisgericht, not recognized, however, but vigor-
ously opposed by almost all German writers on
criminal law. In limiting responsibility by de-
manding "reasonableness of the effort," however,
Hall makes allowance for an objective criterion
relative to danger. Hereby he recognizes the dis-
tinction between dangerous and non-dangerous
conduct within the realm of impossibility. I wonder
how far Hall's criterion of the "reasonableness of
the effort" is compatible with his statement:
"There are no degrees of impossibility and no
sound basis for distinguishing among the con-




Hall's arguments concerning the doctrine of
mistake are oriented on the contrasting legal prov-
erbs "ignorantia facti excusat" and "ignorantia
juris neminem excusat." The rationale of the first
proverb is explained by the insight that "the
morality of an act is determined by reference to
the actor's opinion of the facts, including his
erroneous beliefs."' ' Thus, mistake of fact is a
defense provided that the actor's viens rea was
lacking due to the fact that he did not doubt the
morality of his act. This should be conceded if his
perception of the facts, "as they reasonably ap-
peared to him,"'47 would exclude criminal liability.
By the requirement: "as they reasonably appeared
to him," the behavior of a "reasonably cautious
and prudent person" is introduced as a criterion.
If the actor's behavior does not correspond to this
standard, i.e., if he acts unreasonably, he is "crimi-
nally liable despite the complete lack of criminal
intent."'' This means, in my opinion, that his
responsibility for an act done intentionally, but
without the care a reasonably cautious and pru-
dent man would have shown with regard to its
consequences, is, in the last result, based on the
blame of negligence. Hall's qualification: "mis-
take of fact is a defense if, because of the mistake,
mens rea is lacking"'49 should be accepted under
the proviso that the mistake was not caused by
negligence.






juris, Hall's starting point is the demand of reli-
ance upon legal authority.15 Individual opinions
and non-authoritative declarations are of no
validity. This is, according to Hall, "the rationale
of ignorantia juris neininem excusat."' According
to this rationale ignorance means lack of coinci-
dence of the defendant's opinion "with the sub-
sequent interpretation of the authorized law-
declaring official."",' The recognition of the formal
principle of legality implied in this statement
appears justified if we admit that the criminal law
expresses the moral ethics of the community
which are meant to serve as everyone's guidance.
For "the simple morality that is relevant to crimi-
nal law" can be understood by any normal adult.i
It is this understanding, not "knowledge of formal
penal law" that is at the bottom of the axiom
"ignorantia juris neminem excusat."
' 4
If the perpetrator's conduct is blameworthy
because it is contrary to the simple morality of the
criminal law, the blame must be limited to errors
relative to proscriptions of the criminal law.
Ignorance of private law is not inconsistent with
the ethical principles expressed by the rules of
criminal law and is to be "treated as a mistake of
fact."155
Two objections may be permitted: First, cases
of fraud and of bigamy often give rise to ardent
discussions as to whether the mistake in issue was
avoidable or not. In borderline cases the simple
morality of criminal law is often clouded. Secondly,
if a mistake of private law is treated as mistake of
fact, a proviso should be made that the mistake
is not excusable if it was avoidable by greater
care on the part of the defendant.
Incidentally, Professor Hall's standpoint re-
minds us, as in the case of the impossibility of an
attempt, of the position taken by the former
German Reicksgericht, which distinguished be-
tween mistakes concerning criminal and non-
criminal (ausserstrafrechltlichent) law. Only the
latter mistake was declared excusable. However,
the distinction did not prove satisfactory and
therefore has been considered untenable by al-
most all German scholars. After 1945 it was
relinquished by the Bundesgerichishof, the suc-
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D. Necessity and Coercian
The last subjects that remain to be mentioned
among the doctrines are necessity and coercion.
There is no difference of opinion relative to the
meaning of these terms: People acting under
necessity or coercion harm persons innocent of
any wrongdoing. Furthermore, there is no doubt
that a cause for arguing about such actions exists
only if the physical force (in the case of necessity)
or compulsion (in the case of coercion) was not
irresistible, so that the free will of the person under
pressure was not excluded. Questionable remain
the legal consequences: Do necessity and coercion
justify the acts that harm innocent people, or
only excuse them? Since this question is commonly
placed in the foreground of discussion, I am sur-
prised by Hall's preliminary statements that
"[E]xcuse and justification are pertinent and useful
in procedure .... But they are fallacious and
misleading when they are applied as notions of
substantive penal theory.'
56
Justification and excuse are terms indicating the
consequences of acting under pressure, as they
do for instance in cases of self-defense and com-
mand or order. In all such cases there is no punish-
ment, provided the act was in fact justified. I
would not know of any reason more stringent than
the exclusion of punishment which would lead
to the conclusion that necessity and coercion are
parts of the system of substantive criminal law.
Incidentally, it seems strange to me to find the
essential arguments concerning justification and
excuse not in chapter 12, "Necessity and Coer-
cion," but in chapter 7, "Harm." If it is the pres-
sure exacted by necessity or coercion on account of
which a person is not held responsible, then it is
his acting, not the harm caused by it, which is
justified or excused. This becomes evident when
for instance A, who wants B to be killed, instigates
him to attack C, and C kills B in legitimate self-
defense. By using C as his instrument, A is respon-
sible for the death of B because A's conduct is not
justified, but punishable as a purposely committed
crime.
As to the question under which conditions ac-
tions under pressure are justified or only excused,
Hall seems to reject this distinction a limine. He
refers approvingly, if I am not mistaken, to the
doctrine "that a very high probability of complete
destruction by physical forces is a justification for
sacrifice of some to save some, provided the method
156 P. 233.
of selection is fair."' If this would be so, the person
chosen to be sacrificed would not have the right to
defend himself! As to coercion, the distinction,
he says, breaks "down completely. ' ' 18 Never-
theless, Hall admits "that the coerced person is
justified in certain situations and that the coercer
is nonetheless liable.""' On the other hand, Hall
realizes that "if coercion is a form of justification,
then, in the usual mode of analysis, the coercer
should not be liable...."160
There can be no doubt that he is liable, because
in the first place he uses another person as his
instrument, and in the second place the act of the
coerced one is not justifiable, but only excusable.
This conclusion, however, appears to Hall un-
tenable since the coerced person remains according
to American law responsible for murder, in Canada
even also for kidnapping, assisting in rape,
mayhem, arson, and other offenses.16' These ex-
ceptions, in which the coerced person is under the
obligation to disregard the danger imminent to
himself if he is asked to inflict grievous harm onto
innocent people, necessarily leads, in my opinion,
to the conclusion that the doctrine of coercion
includes the requirement of evaluation; in other
words, the coerced person may cause some small
harm to an innocent person in order to prevent
grievous harm to himself, but he is not permitted
to cause equal or more grievous harm to an in-
nocent person. To Hall, on the contrary, those
exceptions prove that coercion does not create an
excuse; for "excuse implies complete exculpation,
as in insanity or infancy, no matter what harm
was committed."''1 Against this argument I may
submit that the effect of coercion in modifying
criminal responsibility depends on the foresight
of the legislators or on the opinion of the court,
whereas insanity and infancy are circumstances
which absolutely exclude responsibility by reason
of the lack of criminal capacity. Thus, any inference
from the latter circumstances to the former relative
to their effectiveness is not persuasive.
CONCLUSION
The reader will agree that in reviewing Hall's
General Principles of Criminal Law I have re-









I deemed such criticism necessary since juridical
logic led me to results different from the author's
statements relative to the scope of his principles,
and contrary to the thesis concerning his doctrines,
summarized on page 21, that "A complete defini-
tion of specific crimes must always include the
doctrines."
Questioning the cornerstones of Hall's system
means, of course, questioning the concinnity of
his system as such. Nevertheless, the author's
endeavor to build up a system of criminal law
undoubtedly is meritorious. It will prove to be a
steppingstone and an incentive for further de-
velopment of the system of criminal law.
1963]
